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L-J, INC. V. BITUMINOUS FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE CO.:
A COMEDY OF "OCCURRENCES"
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2005, the South Carolina Supreme Court reheard a decision that
threatened to complicate construction litigation throughout the state. By refiling
its opinion in L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,' the court
attempted to clarify the confusion its original opinion created. The original
opinion stated that the insured's faulty workmanship claim did not constitute an
"occurrence" under the insured's commercial general liability (CGL) policy.'
Without an occurrence, the CGL policy did not require the insurer to satisfy
claims of faulty workmanship.3 Recognizing the clamor from the insurance and
construction industries,4 the supreme court agreed to rehear the case. A South
Carolina federal district court measured the success of the supreme court's
endeavor: "Abandon hope, all ye who enter here." 5
The supreme court's refiled opinion mostly echoed its original opinion;
however, in the refiled opinion an explication of an earlier concession appeared.
Originally, the supreme court suggested CGL policies may cover incidents
involving faulty workmanship if the faulty workmanship results in "property
damage to another."6 In its refiled opinion, the supreme court distinguished
between damage to the contractor's work and damage to other property.7 The
supreme court relied upon a New Hampshire case to distinguish between claims
based solely on faulty workmanship and claims based on faulty workmanship
resulting in damage to other property. In High Country,9 the New Hampshire
Supreme Court found an "occurrence" where the contractor's defective work
resulted in property damage.' 0 However, the faulty workmanship referred to in
1. (Bituminous I1), 366 S.C. 117, 621 S.E.2d 33 (2005).
2. L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (Bituminous 1), No. 25854, 2004 S.C. LEXIS
190, at *1-2 (S.C. Aug. 9, 2004), withdrawn, 366 S.C. 117, 621 S.E.2d 33 (2005).
3. Id. at *9-10.
4. See Pa. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ely Wall & Ceilings, Inc., No. Civ.A.4:04-1576-RBH, 2006 WL
569589, at *7 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2006).
5. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. R.C. Altman Builders, Inc., No. 2:01-4267-DCN, 2006 WL 2137233,
at *1 (D.S.C. July 28, 2006) (citing DANTE, THE DIVINE COMEDY (INFERNO), CANTO III (n.p., n.d)).
6. Bituminous 1, 2004 S.C. LEXIS 190, at *9.
7. See Bituminous 11, 366 S.C. 117, 123 & n.4, 621 S.E.2d 33, 36 & n.4 ("The CGL policy may,
however, provide coverage in cases where faulty workmanship causes.., damage to other property,
not in cases where faulty workmanship damages the work product alone.").
8. See id. at 123, 621 S.E.2d at 36 (citing High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474
(N.H. 1994)).
9. 648 A.2d 474.
10. Id. at 477.
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High Country damaged only the contractor's project." Thus, the South Carolina
Supreme Court used a case involving faulty workmanship resulting in damage
solely to the contractor's "work product" as an example of faulty workmanship
resulting in damage to other property. The challenge for attorneys on both sides
of CGL policy litigation lies in defining what a court considers the work product
of the contractor.
By emphasizing the facts of High Country, attorneys for contractors with
CGL policies could characterize each component of the contractor's project as
separate work products. Therefore, where a subcontractor's defective
construction of one component results in damage to another part of the project,
the faulty workmanship has damaged other property. This characterization
would fit squarely in the exception suggested by the South Carolina Supreme
Court.'2 On the other side, attorneys for the insurers could ignore the facts of
High Country and argue that the work product is the contractor's entire project.
Therefore, any damage resulting from a subcontractor's faulty construction that
damages only other parts of the contractor's project would not qualify as damage
to other property. Consequently, CGL policies would only provide coverage
when the faulty workmanship damages property beyond the contractor's entire
project.
This Note argues that the facts of High Country are indispensable to a
discussion of the supreme court's suggestion that policy coverage may extend to
situations involving property damage to another. It is possible the supreme court
deliberately used High Country to create a significant exception, which would
prevent insurance companies from arguing that the supreme court established a
bright-line rule against faulty workmanship claims.' 3 High Country thus
provides important guidance in framing the impact of Bituminous I.
Part II of this Note begins with a general description of CGL policies and
then provides background to both the original and refiled Bituminous opinions,
including an in-depth discussion of High Country and the supreme court's
intentions in relying on it. Part III summarizes and analyzes recent treatments of
Bituminous in several South Carolina federal district court opinions, focusing
specifically on how these opinions interpret the supreme court's reliance on
High Country. Part IV briefly examines potential effects of the supreme court's
decision on practitioners and consumers. Part V concludes by explaining that the
supreme court's holding in Bituminous H should be limited to its specific facts,
and by asserting that until the supreme court reexamines the issues raised in
Bituminous II, attorneys for CGL policyholders should narrowly construe the
supreme court's current opinion to hold insurance providers responsible for the
coverage offered in their policies.
11. Seeid. at 476.
12. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
13. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ely Wall & Ceilings, Inc., No. Civ.A.4:04-1576-RBH, 2006 WL
569589, at *6-7 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2006).
[Vol. 58: 533
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A. A General Examination of CGL Policies
Since 1986, a typical CGL policy,'4 like the one issued to the insured in the
Bituminous cases, has covered property damage caused by an "occurrence."' 5
The Bituminous CGL policy defined property damage as "[p]hysical injury to
tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property' 6 and did
not cover property damage that was "expected or intended from the standpoint
of the insured."' 7 The policy defined an occurrence as "an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
conditions."'" However, even with an occurrence, certain policy exclusions
might apply. One exclusion provided that the policy "does not cover [t]hat
particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired, or replaced
because your work was incorrectly performed on it."' 9 The policy defined "your
work" as "[w]ork or operations performed by you or on your behalf.
2 1
According to the policy's language, your work included work performed by a
subcontractor.2' Consequently, if a subcontractor's negligent construction causes
damage to a contractor's project, the policy would not appear to provide
coverage for the cost to restore, repair, or replace the damaged property.
The policy, however, further stated that the your-work exclusion "does not
apply to property damage included in the products-completed operations
hazard. '22 The "products-completed operations hazard provision" provided,
"Your work will be deemed completed ... [w]hen all of the work called for in
your contract has been completed. 2 3 Another exclusion, however, "bars
coverage for [p]roperty damage to your work arising out of it or any part of it
and included in the products-completed operations hazard. 2 4 Although the
vague pronoun reference frustrates any clear interpretation of the exclusion, the
exclusion seems to bar coverage for property damage to the contractor's project
caused by a subcontractor's faulty workmanship. Further examination of the
policy's language reveals an important exception to this exclusion. The policy
states that "the 'your-work' exclusion 'does not apply if the damaged work or
14. See generally Clifford J. Shapiro, Point/Counterpoint: Inadvertent Construction Defects Are
an "Occurrence" Under CGL Policies, CONSTRUCTION LAW, Spring 2002, at 13, 14 [hereinafter
Shapiro, Occurrence Under CGL Policies] (discussing the evolution of CGL policies).
15. Id.; L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 350 S.C. 549, 554, 567 S.E.2d 489, 492
(Ct. App. 2002), rev'd, 366 S.C. 117, 621 S.E.2d 33 (2005).
16. L-J, Inc., 350 S.C. at 554, 567 S.E.2d at 492.
17. Id. at 555, 567 S.E.2d at 492.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 557, 567 S.E.2d at 493 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
20. Id. at 557 n.10, 567 S.E.2d at 493 n.10.
21. See id. at 558, 567 S.E.2d at 494.
22. Id. at 557, 567 S.E.2d at 493 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Id. at 558, 567 S.E.2d at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the work out of which the damage arises was performed on your behalf by a
subcontractor."
25
Importantly, this last exception to the your-work exclusion did not appear in
CGL policies until 1986.26 Although such an exception significantly extends
coverage for a contractor who constructs the majority of a project through
subcontractors, courts have argued that they "'have not made the policy closer to
a performance bond for general contractors, the insurance industry has.'
27
Applying the policy's plain language to a hypothetical situation helps frame
the pertinent issues presented in this Note. A general contractor with a typical
post-1986 CGL policy hires various subcontractors to build a home. The
plumbing subcontractor negligently installs certain pipes. Years after the
completion of the home, the owners discover that the negligently installed pipes
have been leaking for some time. The leaks have damaged other parts of the
house, such as the walls and ceilings. The damage appears to be an occurrence
under the policy because the negligent installation of the pipes has caused
physical injury to tangible property, that is, the water-rotted walls and ceilings.
Furthermore, the general contractor did not "intend or expect" the "continuous"
exposure to the water from the leaking pipes. Additionally, the damage occurred
after the general contractor completed the project, and therefore the damage fits
the products-completed operations hazard. Most importantly, because the
subcontractor's faulty workmanship caused the damage, the occurrence qualifies
for the policy's subcontractor exception to the your-work exclusion. Although
the CGL policy does not cover the subcontractor's faulty workmanship-the
cost of replacing the pipes-the policy should cover the damages caused by the
defective pipes.
Of course, such an argument for coverage proves more challenging if a court
decides that the damage caused by the subcontractor was not an occurrence. The




In 1989, L-J, Inc. (Contractor) began construction on a roadway system for
Dunes West Joint Venture (Developer).2 8 To complete the project, the
Contractor hired several subcontractors who performed the majority of the
work.29 The Contractor finished construction in 1990; however, by 1994, the
25. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. See Shapiro, Occurrence Under CGL Policies, supra note 14, at 14.
27. L-J, Inc., 350 S.C. at 559, 567 S.E.2d at 494 (quoting Kalchthaler v. Keller Constr. Co., 591
N.W.2d 169, 174 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999)).
28. Bituminous 11, 366 S.C. 117, 119, 621 S.E.2d 33, 34 (2005).
29. Id. at 199,621 S.E.2d at 34.
[Vol. 58: 533
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road had deteriorated, leading the Developer to bring suit against the Contractor
for breach of warranty, breach of contract, and negligence.3 ° Expert witnesses
attributed the road's deterioration, commonly referred to as "alligator cracking,"
to several instances of faulty workmanship by the subcontractors, which left the
roadway vulnerable to water damage.31
2. Procedural History
After the underlying lawsuit settled for $750,000, the Contractor sought
indemnification from four insurers, including Bituminous. 32 Although three of
the insurers agreed to contribute to the settlement, Bituminous refused,
prompting the other insurers to bring a declaratory judgment action against
Bituminous.33 Both a special master and the court of appeals found that the
damage to the roadway system constituted an occurrence under the CGL
policy. 34 The court of appeals reported that the policy defined an occurrence as
"an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the
same general harmful conditions., 35 Defining the repeated exposure to water
runoff as an accident, the court of appeals held that the damage to the roadway
qualified as an occurrence under the CGL policy.36 Furthermore, the special
master and the court of appeals found that certain exclusions contained in the
Contractor's CGL policy "did not apply to work performed by the
subcontractors."3 7
3. The South Carolina Supreme Court's Decision
In finding no occurrence under the CGL policy, the South Carolina Supreme
Court reversed the lower courts' decisions.3" The supreme court found no
occurrence "because there was no accident causing injury., 39 The supreme court
disagreed with the court of appeals's characterization of the road system's
continuous exposure to surface water runoff as an accident.4 ° Instead, the
supreme court reached the following conclusion:
30. Id.
31. See id at 122, 621 S.E.2d at 36 ("[A]pproximately 50% of the cracking was caused by
insufficient road subgrade preparation .... [An expert] also opined that the cracking was caused by
insufficiently thick road course, improper drainage, and excessive traffic.").
32. Id. at 119, 621 S.E.2d at 34.
33. Id. at 119-120, 621 S.E.2d at 34.
34. Id. at 120, 621 S.E.2d at 34.
35. L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 350 S.C 549, 555, 567 S.E.2d 489, 492 (Ct.
App. 2002), rev'd, 366 S.C. 117, 621 S.E.2d 33 (2005).
36. Id.
37. See Bituminous H, 366 S.C. at 120, 621 S.E.2d at 34.
38. Bituminous 1, No. 25854, 2004 S.C. LEXIS 190, at *5 (S.C. Aug. 9, 2004), withdrawn, 366
S.C. 117, 621 S.E.2d 33 (2005).
39. Id. at* 13.
40. Id. at *10 (citing L-J, Inc., 350 S.C. at 555, 567 S.E.2d at 492).
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While the alligator cracking may have constituted property
damage, we find that no occurrence took place as defined by
the CGL contract. . . . [T]he only occurrences were various
negligent acts by the Contractor during road design,
preparation, and construction that led to the premature
deterioration of the roads. . . .We find that all of these
contributing factors are examples of faulty workmanship
causing damage to the roadway system only, which does not
fall within the contractual definition of occurrence under
Bituminous's CGL policy.4
The supreme court defined the cost to repair the negligently constructed road as
economic loss caused solely by faulty workmanship, a cost for which CGL
insurance providers were not liable.42
The supreme court recognized that the lack of an occurrence rendered moot
the issue of the policy's exclusions;43 nevertheless, the court decided the your-
work exclusion did not apply because of the subcontractor exception to the
exclusion." The supreme court pointed out that "[t]he exception to the exclusion
provides: This exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or the work out of
*hich the damage arises was performed on your behalf by a subcontractor."4 5 By
so ruling, the supreme court indicated that if it had found an occurrence, then the
CGL policy would have covered the damage even though the subcontractors'
faulty workmanship caused the damage.
C. Bituminous II
The supreme court's original opinion reversing the court of appeals's
decision had an immediate impact on construction lawyers around the state.46
Confronted with concern over the potential effects of its initial decision,47 the
supreme court agreed to rehear the case. 8 Unfortunately, as evidenced by recent
41. Id. at *6-7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id. at *7 (citing C.D. Walters Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 281 S.C. 593,
596-97, 316 S.E.2d 709, 711-12 (Ct. App. 1984)).
43. Id. at *ll.
44. Id. at *12.
45. Id. (emphasis in original in bold).
46. See Anne Marie McNeil, Note, L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Insurance Co.: In
Determining Coverage Under Commercial General Liability Policies, Should Policy Language or
Public Policy Control? 56 S.C. L. REv. 791, 801 (2005) (discussing the impact of Bituminous I and
predicting that insurance companies would begin to refuse providing coverage for defective work
"regardless of the circumstances").
47. Id.; see also Pa. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ely Wall & Ceilings, Inc., No. Civ.A.4:04-1576-RBH,
2006 WL 569589, at *7 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2006) (describing the "turmoil" created by Bituminous I).
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South Carolina federal district court opinions, the refiled opinion failed to
adequately settle the issue.49
Upon rehearing, the supreme court deviated only slightly from its original
opinion. As in its first opinion, the supreme court held the Contractor's faulty
workmanship "did not constitute an occurrence." 50 However, two significant
distinctions between the opinions exist: the absence of a discussion about the
exclusions in the CGL policy and the appearance of the High Country decision,
which formed the basis for at least a portion of the supreme court's reasoning.
1. The "Your Work" Exclusion
Although in its first hearing of the case the supreme court found no
occurrence, the court still addressed the your-work exclusion in its first
opinion.5 In rehearing the case, the supreme court determined that no
occurrence existed, and it did not discuss the your-work exclusion.52
Consequently, absent from the refiled opinion is the conclusion that the
subcontractor exception renders the your-work exclusion inapplicable. 53 Without
this conclusion, it remains unclear whether a South Carolina court would
interpret the subcontractor exception as rendering the your-work exclusion
inapplicable. Thus, South Carolina courts could still find the your-work
exclusion applies to damage caused by a subcontractor's faulty workmanship,
even when it finds an occurrence.
2. High Country Associates v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.
More notable than the absence of the exclusion discussion in Bituminous H
is the supreme court's treatment of a New Hampshire Supreme Court decision.
Purportedly in an effort to distinguish between a faulty workmanship claim and
a property damage claim, the South Carolina Supreme Court offered the
reasoning of High Country Associates v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.5" The
supreme court used the analysis in High Country to expound upon a possibility it
49. See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. R.C. Altman Builders, Inc., No. 2:01-4267-DCN, 2006 WL
2137233, at * I n. I (D.S.C. July 28, 2006) (recognizing the "ambiguities" surrounding the Bituminous
H decision); Pa. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 WL 569589, at *7 (describing possible alternative
interpretations of Bituminous I1).
50. Bituminous It, 366 S.C. 117, 123, 621 S.E.2d 33, 36 (2005) (holding the damage did not
constitute an occurrence); accord Bituminous 1, 2004 S.C. LEXIS 190, at *1 (same).
51. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
52. Bituminous H, 366 S.C. at 125, 621 S.E.2d at 37.
53. Compare id. (declining to address whether the policy exclusions apply), with Bituminous 1,
2004 S.C. LEXIS 190, at * 13 (concluding the your work exclusion was inapplicable).
54. Bituminous 11, 366 S.C. at 123, 621 S.E.2d 36 (citing High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co.,
648 A.2d 474 (N.H. 1994)).
2007]
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conceded in its first opinion:5 the CGL policy may cover property damage to
another resulting from faulty workmanship. 6
High Country also involved an insurance company arguing that the CGL
policy in question did not cover a contractor's claim for damages. 7 The South
Carolina Supreme Court noted that the High Country court held the CGL policy
covered the contractor's claim. 8 The complaint in High Country alleged
"negligent construction that resulted in property damage and not merely
negligent construction damaging only the work product itself."59 In addition, the
complaint in High Country described how the negligent construction of a
subcontractor allowed water to seep into the walls of the buildings.6" The New
Hampshire court read the complaint as claiming damages for the water-damaged
walls, rather than the cost of rectifying the negligent construction.6 To the New
Hampshire court, this distinction qualified the damage as an occurrence under
the CGL policy.
62
Applying the New Hampshire court's reasoning to Bituminous I, the South
Carolina Supreme Court emphasized that the complaint failed to allege property
damage beyond negligent construction. 63 Because the complaint alleged only
faulty workmanship, the supreme court decided the CGL policy provided no
coverage.' Conversely, had the complaint alleged property damage beyond
faulty workmanship, the CGL policy would probably have provided coverage.
As a result, the supreme court would likely have upheld an order for
indemnification and contribution if the Developer had claimed damages to repair
damaged property beyond the work product itself, rather than money damages to
compensate for the faulty workmanship.
3. Analysis of the Reasoning in Bituminous II
Unfortunately, Bituminous II has failed to quell the confusion left in the
wake of the original opinion.65 Ironically, most of the uncertainty stems from the
supreme court's reference to High Country, seemingly used by the court to
clarify the law.
The supreme court's first misstep occurred when it asserted that the New
Hampshire court held the CGL policy in High Country provided coverage for
the alleged property damage.66 The High Country court, however, simply ruled
55. Bituminous 1, 2004 S.C. LEXIS 190, at *9.
56. Bituminous II, 366 S.C. at 123 n.4, 621 S.E.2d at 36 n.4.
57. See High Country, 648 A.2d at 475.
58. Bituminous 11, 366 S.C. at 123, 621 S.E.2d at 36 (citing High Country, 648 A.2d at 477).
59. Id.
60. High Country, 648 A.2d at 477.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 478.
63. Bituminous I, 366 S.C. at 124, 621 S.E.2d at 36.
64. Id.
65. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
66. Bituminous 11, 366 S.C. at 123, 621 S.E.2d at 36 (citing High Country, 648 A.2d at 477).
[Vol. 58: 533
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that the alleged damages in the case constituted an occurrence under the CGL
policy.67 The New Hampshire court reversed only the lower court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the insurer, leaving for remand the issue of
whether the policy actually provided coverage.68
The South Carolina Supreme Court also muddled the facts of High Country
when it used the case to draw a distinction between "a claim for faulty
workmanship versus a claim for damage to the work product caused by the
negligence of a third party. '69 The facts of High Country reveal that a third party
did not cause the damage to the project (the construction of condominium units);
instead, the complaint alleged the contractor defectively constructed the
condominiums, leading to the loss of structural integrity.7" Based on those facts,
two possibilities exist: either the South Carolina Supreme Court considers a
subcontractor a third party, or the court failed to appreciate the factual
background of High Country. The first possibility seems implausible because
subcontractors work on behalf of contractors and, therefore, are not considered
third parties. Similarly, it seems unlikely that the supreme court was not well-
acquainted with the specific facts of High Country. The implausibility of both
explanations inevitably leads to confusion in attempting to discern the supreme
court's purpose in utilizing High Country.
Furthermore, an examination of these facts seems to undermine the supreme
court's use of High Country to support the proposition that CGL policies do not
cover negligent construction damaging the work product itself.7 The complaint
in High Country alleged faulty construction of the condominium's exterior
walls, which allowed water seepage that not only damaged the walls but also
other parts of the project.7 2 Again, two possibilities exist: either the South
Carolina Supreme Court considered each component of a construction project as
a work product separate from other components, or the supreme court failed to
appreciate the factual background of High Country.
The first possible interpretation, defining work product as a discrete
component of the project rather than the entire project, could be reconciled with
the facts of Bituminous because the only product involved was the roadway.73 If
the supreme court viewed the roadway as a uniform product with no component
parts, then the faulty workmanship of the Contractor damaged only the work
67. See High Country, 648 A.2d at 478.
68. Id. ("We decline to consider the exclusions on the current state of the record and remand to
the trial court for further proceedings."). The South Carolina Supreme Court also declined to reach the
issue of policy exclusions in Bituminous II, but for different reasons. Bituminous 11, 366 S.C. at 125,
621 S.E.2d at 37. Because the supreme court ruled the damage did not constitute an occurrence, it
remains unclear how South Carolina courts would treat the policy exclusions.
69. Bituminous H, 366 S.C. at 123-24, 621 S.E.2d at 36 (citing High Country, 648 A.2d at 477).
70. High Country, 648 A.2d at 476.
7 I. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
72. High Country, 648 A.2d at 477.
73. See Bellino v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. C.A.3:05-1459-CMC, 2006 WL 1129402, at *3 (D.S.C.
Apr. 27, 2006) (finding no occurrence where the property damage did not extend beyond the
construction of a pool).
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product itself. Outside the context of the particular facts of Bituminous, however,
the supreme court's reasoning raises significant questions. Applying the same
analysis to a situation involving a house or an office park, whether coverage
exists under a CGL policy turns entirely upon how a court defines work product.
If a court finds that each part of the project, such as a wall or a roof or the
foundation, is a separate work product, then a court could determine the CGL
policy covers the damage. For instance, if faulty construction of a foundation
causes damage to other parts of a house, a court might hold the damage
constitutes an occurrence. The New Hampshire court's reasoning in High
Country seems to support such an argument.74
Alternatively, arguing that a court should consider the entire project as the
work product requires assuming the South Carolina Supreme Court relied only
on the analysis of High Country and not its facts. This assumption seems odd
because the supreme court chose to examine High Country out of several cases
cited from other jurisdictions, two of which found no occurrence where the
subcontractors caused damage to other parts of the project.75 One cited case,
Monticello Insurance Co. v. Wil-Freds Construction, Inc., offered a hypothetical
example of damage extending beyond the project that would have been an
occurence.76 The Monticello court held the general contractor's CGL policy did
not cover a subcontractor's faulty workmanship that damaged other parts of the
contractor's municipal parking garage project.77 However, the Monticello court
recognized the CGL policy would have provided coverage if the faulty
workmanship had resulted in damage to cars parked in the garage.78 If the South
Carolina Supreme Court meant to limit coverage to situations involving damage
to a third person's property, it could have relied upon Monticello. Instead, the
supreme court simply placed Monticello in a list of other cases without
discussing the cases' reasoning.79
By choosing to focus on High Country, a case from a jurisdiction the
supreme court recognized as construing CGL policies in the insured's favor,8"
the supreme court implied that it preferred the New Hampshire court's approach
over the other cited cases. This preference suggests the supreme court offered its
reliance on High Country as an interpretation of its original concession
74. High Country, 648 A.2d at 477.
75. See Bituminous 11, 366 S.C. at 121, 621 S.E.2d at 35 (citing Heile v. Herrmann, 736 N.E.2d
566, 568 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (holding that damage to a general contractor's project caused by a
subcontractor's faulty workmanship was not an occurrence under a CGL policy); Monticello Ins. Co.
v. Wil-Freds Constr., Inc., 661 N.E.2d 451,456 (111. App. Ct. 1996) (finding no occurrence when faulty
workmanship damaged only the general contractor's project)).
76. 661 N.E.2d at 457.
77. Id. at 456.
78. Id. at 457.
79. See Bituminous I1, 366 S.C. at 121, 621 S.E.2d at 35 (citations omitted).
80. See id. at 121 n.3, 621 S.E.2d at 35 n.3 ("[T]here are several jurisdictions, including... New
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concerning the type of damage possibly covered by a CGL policy.8' The
supreme court arguably used High Country, a case involving faulty
workmanship damaging only other parts of the contractor's project, as an
example of damage to "another," damage possibly covered as an occurrence
under a CGL policy. Such an interpretation would ameliorate the dramatic
effects predicted after the court's original opinion.8 2 If the facts of a case parallel
the facts of High Country, an insured contractor could argue that a
subcontractor's damage to other parts of the project should be covered under a
CGL policy.
III. RECENT SOUTH CAROLINA FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS
Recent opinions of South Carolina federal district courts illustrate the
difficulty of clarifying the confusion surrounding the supreme court's decision in
Bituminous H.
A. Pennsylvania National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ely Wall & Ceilings,
Inc.
Recognizing the unsettled nature of the state issues, the federal district court
in Pennsylvania National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ely Wall & Ceilings, Inc.83
granted a motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment action brought by
Pennsylvania National Mutual Insurance Company (Penn National).84 The
defendant homeowners, organized as the Ocean Bay Club HPR (Ocean Bay),
sought damages arising from the work of Ely Wall & Ceilings, Inc. (Ely Wall),
which installed exterior stucco for Ocean Bay's condominium project.85
Improper installation allowed moisture to seep through the skin of the exterior
cladding, resulting in damage to other parts of the condominium project.86
Multiple faulty workmanship claims against Ely Wall prompted Penn National,
Ely Wall's insurer, to seek a declaratory judgment that the CGL policies issued
to Ely Wall did not cover such claims under South Carolina law.87
In its motion to dismiss, Ocean Bay argued that due to the novel question of
whether a CGL policy defined damage caused by faulty workmanship as an
occurrence, the district court should abstain from deciding the issue.88
Conceding that the district court should dismiss its action if the action raised
81. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., McNeil, supra note 46, at 802 ("[T]he South Carolina Supreme Court... provided
insurance companies a way to refuse coverage ... , and forced contractors and potentially innocent
property owners to bear the risk of loss if subcontractors perform their work negligently.").
83. No. Civ.A.4:04-1576-RBH, 2006 WL 569589 (D.S.C. Mar. 6,2006).
84. See id at *9-10.
85. See id. at *1, *6.
86. See id.
87. Id. at *1.
88. See id at *3-4.
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difficult questions regarding state law, Penn National nevertheless posited that
the recent Bituminous I decision had settled the issue. 89 Therefore, Penn
National asserted, "resolution of th[e] case require[d] the routine application of
settled princip[les] of law to particular disputed facts."9
Aware of the importance of leaving close or difficult state law questions to
"the most authoritative voice,"9 1 the district court examined Bituminous HI:92
[B]ecause the facts of this case are distinguishable from those
in the [Bituminous 11] case, the decision in [Bituminous 11] may
not answer several questions presented in the present case....
[T]his court finds that the [Bituminous I1] opinion does not
necessarily reflect settled law as to the issue of occurrence and
coverage under the CGL policies at issue in this case. 93
Judge Harwell further suggested that the ruling in Bituminous II might be limited
to the specific facts of the case-alligator cracking that only damaged the
roadway system. 94
To further support the possibility of a fact-specific holding in Bituminous II,
the district court noted the supreme court's discussion of High Country.9 5 The
district court suggested that the Bituminous H court relied on High Country to
distinguish a complaint alleging faulty construction that damaged only the work
product itself from a complaint alleging faulty construction that resulted in
property damage.96 Because Pennsylvania National contained facts similar to
High Country, the district court speculated that the South Carolina Supreme
Court might employ the rationale of the High Country court and find coverage.97
Because of this possibility, the district court expressed discomfort in attempting
to predict what the supreme court would hold if faced with the present case or a
similar case.98
Importantly, Judge Harwell also recognized the legitimacy of an argument
that the supreme court's discussion of High Country was only dictum.9 9 Framing
the supreme court's treatment of High Country as dictum resuscitates the
argument that Bituminous 11 in fact establishes the following bright-line rule:
"[F]aulty construction is not an occurrence under a CGL insurance policy.""10
89. Id. at *4.
90. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
91. Id. at *5 (quoting Mitcheson v. Harris, 955 F.2d 235, 237 (4th Cir. 1992)).
92. See id. at *5-7.
93. Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id.
95. Id. at *6.
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Faced with such "close, problematic, and difficult"'' ° issues of state law, the
district court dismissed Penn National's declaratory judgment action, believing
such complicated issues fell within the purview of the state courts.1
0 2
Although the district court discussed the possibility that CGL policies could
cover faulty workmanship that damaged property beyond the work product, the
facts of Pennsylvania National did not require the district court to define what
qualified as the work product. 3 The High Country court indisputably held that
damage to other parts of the contractor's construction project caused by the
subcontractor's faulty workmanship constituted an occurrence under the
contractor's CGL policy.0 4 The facts in Pennsylvania National also involved a
subcontractor's faulty construction that damaged other parts of a construction
project; however, the faulty workmanship of Ely Wall extended beyond the
exterior stucco siding that was Ely Wall's work product.'0 5
A distinction may be drawn between what a subcontractor's CGL policy
covers and what a contractor's CGL policy covers. A subcontractor's damage to
other parts of the project upon which the subcontractor performed no work
might be defined as an occurrence under a subcontractor's CGL policy because
the damage extended beyond the work product itself However, that same
damage would not constitute an occurrence under the general contractor's CGL
policy because the damage did not extend beyond the general contractor's work
product-the entire project. As reasonable as this argument appears, High
Country did not involve a subcontractor's CGL policy; it involved a general
contractor's CGL policy.'0 6 This particular distinction fails to solve the riddle of
what the Bituminous 1I court sought to accomplish by relying on High Country.
B. Owners Insurance Co. v. Lang's Heating & Air Conditioning
Recognizing a distinction between contractors and subcontractors, the
district court in Owners Insurance Co. v. Lang's Heating & Air Conditioning'
0 7
granted Owners Insurance Company's partial summary judgment motion. 10 8
Because the faulty workmanship of the subcontractor, Lang's Heating & Air
Conditioning (Lang's) damaged parts of the building that were not worked on by
Lang's, Judge Norton found the damage amounted to an occurrence under
Lang's CGL policy.'0 9 As a result, the district court held that Lang's co-
101. Id. at *7.
102. Id.
103. See id. at *6-7.
104. See High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 477, 478 (N.H. 1994).
105. See Pa. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 WL 569589, at *6.
106. See High Country, 648 A.2d at 475.
107. No. 2:05-2916, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18898 (D.S.C. Apr. 10, 2006).
108. Id. at *10, *12.
109. 1d. at *1-2, *10-11.
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defendant and insurer, Selective Insurance Company (Selective), had a duty to
defend its insured." 0
The homeowners' underlying complaint alleged that Lang's faulty
workmanship led to damage to other parts of the house that were not worked on
by Lang's."' Selective argued that it had no duty to defend Lang's against the
homeowners' action because Lang's faulty workmanship did not constitute an
occurrence under the CGL policy." 2 The district court rejected Selective's
argument, finding "the claims against Lang's constitute[d] an occurrence as
defined by even the most restrictive interpretations of [Bituminous I!].,,Ll3 In
reaching this conclusion, Judge Norton relied on the supreme court's suggestion
in Bituminous H that CGL policies may cover damages to other property beyond
the work product itself.' 14 The damage caused to other parts of the house that
were not worked on by Lang's extended beyond the work product itself,
therefore, the district court concluded it amounted to an occurrence.' 15
C. Okatie Hotel Group, LLC v. Amerisure Insurance Co.
In Okatie Hotel Group, LLC v. Amerisure Insurance Co.,"' the district court
dealt with the more complex issue of whether a general contractor's CGL policy
covered damage to the project caused by a subcontractor's faulty
workmanship.' The Okatie court decided the alleged faulty workmanship
resulted in an occurrence, and it denied the defendant insurer's motion for
judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for summary judgment." 8 The
plaintiff, Okatie Hotel Group (Okatie), contracted with Devcon Group, Inc.
(Devcon) to build a hotel." 9 The defendant insurer, Amerisure Insurance
Company (Amerisure), issued several CGL policies to Devcon. 120 Due to the
improper performance of Devcon's subcontractors, "the hotel suffered extensive
moisture damage.'
121
Despite a state circuit court's judgment against Devcon in a suit by Okatie,
Amerisure refused to indemnify its insured. 22 In response to Amerisure's
refusal, Okatie filed a breach of contract claim against Amerisure in state court,
which Amerisure later removed to federal court. 123 Amerisure first denied that
110. Seeid at *11-12.
111. Id. at *11.
112. Id. at *7-8.
113. Id. at *9-10.
114. Id. at *10 (quoting Bituminous II, 366 S.C. at 123, 621 S.E.2d at 36).
115. Id. at *10-11.
116. No. Civ.A.2:04-2212-23, 2006 WL 91577 (D.S.C. Jan. 13, 2006).
117. Id. at *1.
118. Id. at *6.




123. Id. (footnote omitted).
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the CGL policies issued to Devcon provided coverage, and then moved for
judgment on the pleadings, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. 24 In its
motion, Amerisure argued that faulty workmanship did not constitute an
occurrence under South Carolina law.' 25 In response, Okatie argued its
subcontractors' negligent construction was not the occurrence but "that the result
of the negligent construction caused an occurrence."' 26
In deciding whether the damage caused by Devcon's subcontractors
constituted an occurrence, Judge Duffy first pointed out that the definition of
occurrence under the instant CGL policy was the same as that in the CGL policy
examined in Bituminous ii.127 In discussing Bituminous II, Judge Duffy focused
on the supreme court's reliance on High Country.2 ' Judge Duffy recounted the
High Country court's decision by stating, "[w]here the complaint alleged
negligent construction that resulted in property damage caused by continuous
exposure to moisture and not merely negligent construction damaging only the
work product, the CGL policy provided coverage.
Although Amerisure attempted to minimize the role of High Country in the
Bituminous II decision, the Okatie court emphasized High Country's influence
on South Carolina law. 3 ° In reconciling the results of High Country and
Bituminous II, Judge Duffy outlined a distinction between the allegations in
High Country and the allegations in Bituminous H: the High Country allegations
claimed that continuous exposure to water caused damage to other parts of the
project, while the allegations in Bituminous II only claimed faulty
workmanship.' 13 Based on this distinction, the district court opined that property
damage resulting from such continuous exposure to water constituted an
occurrence under the CGL policy. 132 In summary, Judge Duffy reached the
following conclusion:
[C]ontrary to the circumstances in [Bituminous 1], [Okatie] in
the present case ... alleged property damage beyond damage to
the work product and/or the improper performance of the task
itself. Accordingly, the court holds that although damage to
work product alone, caused by faulty workmanship, does not
constitute an occurrence, the property damage to [Okatie]'s
hotel-caused by exposure to the harmful condition of leaks
124. Id.
125. Id. at *2.
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. Id. at *5 n.6 (citing Bituminous II, 366 S.C. 117, 621 S.E.2d 33 (2005)).
128. Id. at *5 (citing Bituminous II, 366 S.C. at 123, 621 S.E.2d at 36).
129. Id. at *5 (citing High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474,477 (N.H. 1994)).
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and moisture-constituted an occurrence under the CGL
policies issued by [Amerisure] to Devcon.'33
For those reasons, the district court denied Amerisure's motion.'34
The Okatie court rejected Amerisure's argument that Bituminous I created a
bright-line rule concerning faulty workmanship. Instead, the Okatie court felt
compelled to account for the supreme court's reliance on High Country, finding
that a subcontractor's faulty construction that damaged other parts of the
contractor's project resulted in an occurrence.35
Although not discussed directly, the Okatie court probably decided that the
damage squared with the exception carved out by the Bituminous II court.
13 6
After all, the Bituminuous H court used High Country to illustrate the type of
case that would fit into the exception.'37 Because the facts in Okatie more
closely resembled the facts in High Country than the facts in Bituminous II, the
district court seems to have decided the exception applied. The Okatie court's
opinion, however, failed to explain how the damage to the hotel extended
beyond the work product. To fit into the Bituminous I court's exception, the
Okatie court must have viewed the subcontractor's wall, but not the entire hotel
construction project, as the work product. Therefore, the faulty construction of
the walls led to damage beyond the work product alone, namely the other parts
of the general contractor's entire project. After Okatie, the question remained
whether other courts would adopt a similar definition of work product.
D. Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Ass'n Insurance Co. v. Dargan
Construction Co.
Recently, a district court adopted the Okatie court's reasoning when it
ordered the plaintiff insurer, Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Insurance
Company (Penn Insurance), to defend and indemnify the defendant contractor,
Dargan Construction Company (Dargan)' 38 As general contractor for three
separate hotel and resort projects, Dargan hired several subcontractors to
perform the majority of the construction. 39 After Dargan finished construction,
Penn Insurance issued a CGL policy to Dargan. 140 Following the discovery of
moisture damage to the projects, the owners filed complaints against Dargan
133. Id.
134. Id. at *7.
135. "The parties in Okatie ... settled before the [district] court could rule on a motion for
reconsideration." Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. R.C. Altman Builders, Inc., No. 2:01-4267-DCN, 2006 WL
2137233, at *4 n.9 (D.S.C. July 28, 2006).
136. Bituminous 11, 366 S.C. 117, 123 & n.4, 621 S.E.2d 33, 36 & n.4 (2005) ("The CGL policy
may, however, provide coverage in cases where faulty workmanship causes ... damage to other
property, not in cases where faulty workmanship damages the work product alone.")
137. Id.
138. No. 4:05-113-25-TLW-TER, 2006 WL 2038270, at *4-5 (D.S.C. July 20, 2006).
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alleging defective construction that caused "deterioration . . . and corrosion of
the various components of the buildings."' 14 1 Penn Insurance agreed to defend
Dargan in the underlying suits pending the court's declaration as to Penn
Insurance's duty to defend and indemnify Dargan. 1
42
The Dargan court noted the CGL policy contained the standard definition of
occurrence. 143 The court understood the underlying complaints to request an
award not only to correct the defective construction, but also to compensate for
the losses resulting from the defective construction.'" Predictably, Penn
Insurance argued that it had no duty to defend Dargan because, as the supreme
court held in Bituminous II, CGL policies do not cover claims of faulty
workmanship. 145 Judge Wooten responded by referring to the Bituminous 1I
court's discussion of High Country.
146
Judge Wooten followed the Okatie court's reasoning and placed significant
importance on the supreme court's reliance on High Country. 47 Finding that the
facts in Dargan "significantly mirror[ed] the facts in High Country,' 4 8 Judge
Wooten reached the same result as the High Country court.'49 Because the
complaint alleged damage to property beyond the work product itself, the
district court found an occurrence, thereby requiring Penn Insurance to defend
Dargan. 15 As in Okatie, the court did not directly define work product, but as in
Okatie, the court probably viewed only the subcontractors' product as the work
product, rather than the entire construction project. Otherwise, the Dargan court
could not have applied the exception described in Bituminous II.
E. Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. R.C. Altman Builders, Inc.
In Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. R.C. Altman Builders, Inc.,'5 ' the district
court held the insured general contractor's CGL policy did not cover damage
caused by a subcontractor's defective work. 152 In reaching its decision, the court
defined the work product as the entire project for which the general contractor
141. See id. at *3.
142. Id. at *2.
143. See id. at *1 ("Occurrence is defined as[] an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. Id. at *3.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id. ("[T]he reference to High Country remains significant and provides insight in
distinguishing when a policy would provide coverage and when it would not.").
148. Id. at *4.
149. Id. at *5.
150. Id. at *4-5.
151. No. 2:01-4267-DCN, 2006 WL 2137233 (D.S.C. July 28, 2006). The defendant appealed to
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals after the district court denied its motion to alter or amend. See
Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. R.C. Altman Builders Inc., No. 2:01-4267-DCN, slip op. at 8 (D.S.C. Aug.
21, 2006).
152. Altman, 2006 WL 2137233, at *5.
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was responsible. 153 The court therefore held that a subcontractor's defective
work that damaged only the general contractor's project did not constitute an
occurrence under the CGL policy.'5 4
In the underlying state court action, a homeowner sued R.C. Altman
Builders, Inc. (Altman) alleging that Altman's defective construction "permitted
water intrusion and other damage."' After Altman settled with the homeowner,
Altman's insurer, Bituminous Casualty Corporation (Bituminous), filed a
declaratory judgment action in district court.'5 6 Bituminous asked the district
court to clarify whether Altman's CGL policy provided coverage, arguing that
the damage caused by Altman's subcontractors did not amount to an
occurrence."' Although the magistrate's report found that the allegations
qualified as an occurrence,' the Altman court agreed with Bituminous that there
was no occurrence.
159
After establishing that the CGL policy provisions in Altman mirrored those
in Bituminous 11,16° the court delved into a discussion of Bituminous 11.161 Both
parties in Altman presented interpretations of the Bituminous H court's
suggestion that CGL policies would cover certain damages caused by faulty
workmanship. 162 Bituminous focused on the following two phrases used by the
supreme court: "third party" and "work product alone.' ' 163 Bituminous reasoned
that unless a third party caused the damage, the CGL policy did not provide
coverage. 64 According to this reading, Bituminous had no duty to indemnify
Altman because Altman's subcontractors, not a third party, caused the
damage. 65 Bituminous also asserted that Altman was responsible for the entire
project, so any damage to the project was not damage to property beyond the
work product itself.166 Alternatively, the district court noted that Altman implied
that the "work product [was] not the entire general contractor's project, but each
specific subcontractor's task."' 167 The district court also indicated that Altman
153. See id. at *5.
154. ld.




159. See id at *5.
160. Id. at *2.
161. Id. at *2-3.
162. Id. at *3; see also Bituminous 11, 366 S.C. 117, 123 & n.4, 621 S.E.2d 33, 36 & n.4 (2005)
("The CGL policy may, however, provide coverage in cases where faulty workmanship causes ...
damage to other property, not in cases where faulty workmanship damages the work product alone.")




167. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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failed to discuss the third party language contained in Bituminous H. 168
Ultimately, the Altman court favored Bituminous's reading of Bituminous H.169
In disregarding Altman's reading of Bituminous II, the district court
reproved Altman's emphasis on the outcome of High Country.7 ° The Altman
court found that the supreme court "cited High Country for its analysis, not its
conclusion."'' Because the High Country excerpts in Bituminous H did not
mention whether the insured was the general contractor, Judge Norton
determined Altman could not rely on the facts or the outcome of High
Country. 72 According to Judge Norton, the supreme court used High Country
"to distinguish between damage to defective work and damage stemming from
defective work."' 173 In other words, Judge Norton believed a CGL policy might
cover property damage "stemming from defective work," but a third party must
cause the damage or the damage caused by the contractor or subcontractor must
extend beyond the work product itself. Importantly, Judge Norton viewed work
product as the entire project under the general contractor's control. Based on this
interpretation of Bituminous II, the district court concluded that a
subcontractor's defective work that damaged only other parts of the general
contractor's project did not constitute an occurrence. 1
74
The Altman court assigned little importance to the facts of High Country,
but the supreme court specifically detailed the facts of the complaint underlying
High Country.175 In High Country, the underlying complaint distinguished
between the damage of the defectively constructed walls and the damage to
other parts of the building caused by the defectively constructed walls. 176 By
referring to the facts of the complaint, the Bituminous H court highlighted the
difference between damage to the work product alone and damage to property
beyond the work product. The work product referred to in High Country was the
defectively constructed walls. 177 The damage to the other parts of the building
caused by the defective construction of the walls amounted to damage beyond
the work product.178 This distinction is necessary to the Bituminous II court's
reading of High Country's holding: "In High Country Assocs., the court held that
a CGL provided coverage for property damage caused by continuous exposure
to moisture when the complaint alleged negligent construction that resulted in
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at *4.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at *4 n.8.
174. Id. at*5, *6.
175. Bituminous 11, 366 S.C. 117, 123-124, 621 S.E.2d 33, 36 (2005) (quoting High Country
Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 477 (N.H. 1994)).
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property damage and not merely negligent construction damaging only the work
product itself"'
179
Applying this distinction in Bituminous II, the supreme court viewed the
roadway system as a single work product. 8 ' As a result, because the defective
workmanship only damaged the roadway, the damage did not constitute an
occurrence. 181
Explaining the Bituminous H court's third party language remains
problematic for both Altman and other contractors hoping to recover for claims
made under their CGL policies. It remains unclear why the supreme court would
find High Country helpful in distinguishing between a claim of faulty
workmanship and a claim of damage caused by a third party because High
Country did not involve any third parties." 2 However, this inconsistency does
not affect the Bituminous II court's concession that CGL policies may cover
claims where faulty workmanship causes damage beyond the work product
itself.'83
IV. EFFECT ON PRACTITIONERS AND CONSUMERS
As a result of Bituminous II, attorneys for contractors with CGL policies
now face the challenge of arguing for coverage in an unsettled legal
environment. Based primarily on Bituminous I, major insurance companies
began withdrawing their defenses of contractors in construction defect
litigation. 84 Insurance companies also began "declining settlement offers,
canceling scheduled arbitrations, and refusing to provide coverage under
existing policies.' 85 In short, Bituminous I emboldened insurers to ignore the
plain language of their own policies.'86 However, since the release of Bituminous
II, insurance companies have felt less confident about their post-Bituminous I
positions, and have begun to negotiate settlements and pursue litigation
selectively. 187 Should a large amount of damages be at stake, insurers probably
would file a declaratory judgment action, hoping a court will agree with the
179. Bituminous II, 366 S.C. at 123, 621 S.E.2d at 36 (citing High Country, 648 A.2d at 477)
(emphasis added).
180. See id. at 124, 621 S.E.2d at 36.
181. Id. at 123, 621 S.E.2d at 36.
182. See High Country, 648 A.2d at 476.
183. See Bituminous II, 366 S.C. at 124 n.4, 621 S.E.2d at 36 n.4.
184. See Brief for National Association of Home Builders & Home Builders Association of South
Carolina as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent 24, L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
366 S.C. 117, 621 S.E.2d 33 (2005) (No. 97-CP-10-4790) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of NAHB &
HBASC].
185. McNeil, supra note 46, at 801.
186. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the plain language of CGL policies.
187. Interview with James L. Bruner, Managing Partner, and Wesley D. Peel, Partner, Bruner,
Powell, Robbins, Wall & Mullins, L.L.C., in Columbia, S.C. (Sept. 8, 2006). "Founded in 1991,
BPRWM was established to concentrate on construction litigation... and now comprises the largest
group of attorneys with construction law expertise in one firm in South Carolina." BPRW&M:
Attorneys at Law, What We Do, http://www.bprwm.com/whatwedo.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
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insurers' interpretation of Bituminous IH and find no duty to defend.'88
Conversely, insurers probably would negotiate a settlement if the amount of
damages is relatively minor.'89 With only minor damages at stake, insurers might
be loath to risk an unfavorable court decision that policyholders could use
against insurers in future disputes involving much larger damages.
Overall, insurers enjoy the upper hand in negotiations with attorneys for
CGL policyholders, at least until state courts provide further clarification of
Bituminous II. Attorneys for contractors must advise their clients that, although
the contractors paid premiums for insurance the contractors believed covered the
faulty workmanship of subcontractors, a South Carolina court may disagree. The
attorneys for these contractors must also advise their clients that there is now a
choice between possibly lengthy litigation with uncertain results or settling for
less coverage, if the insurers are willing to consider providing any coverage.
This uncertainty for contractors probably will also negatively affect South
Carolina consumers, including both current and prospective homeowners. Faced
with the possibility of increased exposure to additional costs and litigation
expenses, home builders will probably increase the price of the homes they
build.' 90 In particular, buyers and builders of low to moderate income housing
would suffer due to the costs of increased risk. 9' Additionally, homeowners who
discover damage due to faulty construction will have no remedy if the
responsible builder is either insolvent or no longer in business.'92 Such a result
would contravene the South Carolina Supreme Court's prior announcement that
"South Carolina, through both its courts and legislature, has previously been in
the vanguard of protecting consumers, particularly in the area of home
construction." 93
V. CONCLUSION
Any interpretation of Bituminous H hinges on the degree of significance one
attributes to the supreme court's reliance on High Country. If the supreme court
used High Country only for its reasoning, then insurers could argue that
Bituminous H created a bright-line rule against construing faulty workmanship
as an occurrence. Under this interpretation, a contractor's CGL policy would not
cover any damage to the contractor's project caused by a negligent
subcontractor. As Part IV argued, such a result could have deleterious effects on
South Carolina consumers. Alternatively, if the supreme court relied on both the
reasoning and the facts of High Country, policyholders could argue the supreme
court significantly limited its holding in Bituminous II.
188. Interview with James L. Bruner and Wesley D. Peel, supra note 187.
189. Id.
190. See Amicus Brief of NAHB & HBASC, supra note 184, at 23-24.
191. Id. at 24 n.1.
192. Id. at 24.
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As the supreme court held in Bituminous II, "the damage in the present case
did not constitute an occurrence."' 94 The defective workmanship only damaged
the one work product that existed-the roadway. With no other components
involved, the damage caused by the subcontractor's negligent construction did
not extend beyond the work product. In a situation involving facts similar to
those in High Country, a CGL policyholder should argue that the subcontractor's
negligent construction resulted in damage to other property--components of the
contractor's entire project. According to the supreme court's own language, this
type of damage would constitute an occurrence. 195
Of course, insurers can still argue coverage does not exist because it remains
unclear how the South Carolina Supreme Court would interpret the
subcontractor exception to the your-work exclusion. The plain language of the
CGL policy, however, probably will allow the policyholder to make a persuasive
argument for coverage. However, to reach the issue of the subcontractor
exception provision, attomeys for CGL policyholders must first persuade a
South Carolina court that a subcontractor's damage to other parts of a
contractor's project constitutes an occurrence. Thus, until the supreme court
reexamines the issues surrounding its Bituminous I decision, attorneys should
use the court's reliance on High Country to characterize such damage as an
occurrence.
James P. Sullivan
194. Bituminous H, 366 S.C. 117, 124, 621 S.E.2d 33, 36 (emphasis added and internal quotation
marks omitted).
195. See id at 123, 621 S.E.2d at 36.
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